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pandemic (H1N1) 2009 to oseltamivir. 
This latter point is now under study.
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Marburg Virus in 
Fruit Bat, Kenya 
To the Editor: Lake Victoria Mar-
burgvirus (MARV) causes severe hem-
orrhagic fever with a high case-fatality 
rate in humans. Index cases occurred 
in Europe during 1967 among labora-
tory workers who handled tissues and 
blood samples of nonhuman primates 
from Africa (1). Thereafter, MARV 
was reported throughout sub-Saharan 
Africa. Most outbreaks in humans 
were associated with visits to caves and 
mines (2–6). In Kenya, human cases of 
MARV infection were reported in 1980 
and 1987; these occurred after visits 
to the Kitum Cave at Mount Elgon 
(7,8). MARV was detected in tissues of 
Egyptian fruit bats (Rousettus aegyp-
tiacus) and other bat species from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Gabon, and Uganda (3–6).
We collected bats from across Ke-
nya during June–July 2007 within the 
framework of the Global Disease De-
tection Program, which is dedicated to 
investigation of emerging pathogens. 
Collection protocols were approved 
by the National Museums of Kenya 
and by the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (Atlanta, GA, USA). 
Blood, fecal and oral swab specimens, 
and selected tissue samples were col-
lected from bats and stored on dry ice.
For MARV detection, total RNA 
was extracted from pooled or indi-
vidual liver, spleen, and lung samples 
from 272 bats. Nested reverse tran-
scription–PCR (RT-PCR) with prim-
ers speciﬁ  c for MARV nucleoprotein 
gene was performed as described (5). 
When a band of the expected size was 
detected after electrophoresis on an 
agarose gel, the RT-PCR product was 
sequenced. Laboratory cross-contam-
ination was not a concern because no 
work with MARV had been conducted 
in the facility where the examination 
was performed.
MARV RNA was detected in 
pooled liver, spleen, and lung tissue 
of an apparently healthy, pregnant, 
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Figure. Duration of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 excretion in nasal swabs from patients treated 
with oseltamivir. The number of days from start of oseltamivir treatment to achievement of 
negative results of reverse transcription–PCR (RT-PCR) is indicated for 16 patients. The 3 
patients classiﬁ  ed in the last group (>5 days) are 1 patient with a negative RT-PCR result 
on day 7 posttreatment and 2 patients who still had positive results on day 5 posttreatment 
but provided no additional sample for testing.LETTERS
female  R. aegyptiacus bat obtained 
at Kitum Cave in July 2007 (Figure). 
A faint band was obtained only after 
nested RT-PCR, which suggests that 
the RNA load was limited. Attempts 
at virus isolation were not performed. 
Phylogenetic comparisons demon-
strated that the virus (KE261, Gen-
Bank accession no. GQ499199) was 
relatively distant from previous iso-
lates from Kenya (Musoke and Ravn). 
It was similar to viruses isolated from 
index cases in Europe in 1967 (Popp 
and Ci67). This lineage also contained 
virus 02DRC99, which was isolated 
from a human in the DRC in 1999 
(online Appendix Figure, www.cdc.
gov/EID/content/16/2/352-appF.htm). 
MARV isolates obtained from bats 
and humans in Uganda in 2007 belong 
to distinct lineages (6) (online Ap-
pendix Figure). Tissues of other bats, 
including 75 R. aegyptiacus (29 preg-
nant females) from Kitum Cave and 
neighboring Makingeni Cave, were 
negative for MARV RNA.
Histopathologic examination of 
liver of the infected bat showed no le-
sions that could be ascribed to MARV 
infection, and no MARV antigens 
were detected by immunohistochemi-
cal analysis. Other tissues were not 
examined.
Our results are similar to those 
reported from Gabon and the DRC, 
where MARV RNA was detected in 
tissues of 1.4% and 3.1% of R. aegyp-
tiacus bats, respectively, with negative 
isolation attempts (3,5). A higher prev-
alence (5.1%) was detected in R. ae-
gyptiacus bats from Uganda in 2007, 
where several MARV isolates were 
obtained from bats with high virus 
loads (6). In the DRC, MARV RNA 
was also detected in insectivorous 
bats, including 3.0% of Miniopterus 
inﬂ  atus and 3.6% of Rhinolophus el-
ocuens ( 3,5). However, in Uganda, 
MARV RNA was detected in only 1 
(0.2%) of 609 insectivorous bats (Hip-
posideros spp.) (6).
To date, bats are the only wild 
mammals, besides nonhuman pri-
mates, in which ﬁ  loviruses have been 
detected. Whether bats serve as prin-
cipal reservoir hosts for ﬁ  loviruses is 
unclear. The pathogenesis and clinic 
manifestation of ﬁ  lovirus infection in 
bats are unknown. Colonies of R. ae-
gyptiacus bats in caves often consist 
of thousands of bats. The opportunity 
for conspeciﬁ  c exposure rates in such 
colonies is high. Therefore, bat popu-
lations should have a high seropreva-
lence rate for these viruses. For exam-
ple, seroprevalence to lyssaviruses in 
some bat species that live in colonies 
was reported as high as 60%–70% (9). 
In contrast, seroprevalence of MARV-
neutralizing antibodies in colonies of 
R.  aegyptiacus bats in which PCR-
positive bats were collected was only 
12% (5) or as low as 2.4% (6). This 
low seroprevalence may be interpret-
ed as a result of a limited spillover of 
MARV into bats from another source.
The association of human cases 
of MARV with visiting caves often 
inhabited by R. aegyptiacus and other 
bat species is obvious (3,5,6). This as-
sociation was reinforced by MARV 
infection in tourists who visited caves 
in Uganda (4,10). For Kenya, our ﬁ  nd-
ing is consistent with reported human 
cases tentatively associated with vis-
iting of Kitum Cave (7,8). We do not 
know if MARV has persisted in this 
area continuously or has reemerged 
sporadically. Kitum Cave and other 
similar caves are easily accessible and 
frequently visited by tourists and lo-
cal persons. The likelihood of MARV 
spillover into humans is presently lim-
ited. However, because transmission 
mechanisms and sources of spillover 
infections are unknown, public aware-
ness must be increased and health au-
thorities informed about the presence 
of MARV.
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Figure. Bat collection sites (open circles) and location of Kitum Cave, Kenya, where Lake 
Victoria Marburgvirus was detected (solid circle).LETTERS
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Human African 
Trypanosomiasis in 
Areas without 
Surveillance
To the Editor: Human African 
trypanosomiasis (HAT), sleeping 
sickness, is a systemic protozoan 
disease transmitted by the bite of a 
tsetse ﬂ  y; untreated infection is fatal 
(1). Control of HAT caused by Try-
panosoma brucei gambiense, which 
caused 97% of all cases reported 
from 1997 through 2006 (2), is based 
on active screening of the population 
at risk by mobile teams and treatment 
of all infected persons, with or with-
out vector control.
The epidemiologic curve of re-
ported new cases varies considerably; 
incidence peaks were high in the 1920s 
and 1990s but low in the 1960s and in 
the past decade (2000–2009) (2–4). 
The recent reduction of reported cas-
es (69% decrease from 1997 through 
2006) was made possible by 1) cessa-
tion of large-scale civil wars (e.g., in 
Angola); 2) increased commitment of 
donors, national control programs, the 
World Health Organization (WHO), 
and nongovernment organizations; 
and 3) free production and supply of 
antitrypanosomal drugs. In May 2007, 
after a WHO informal consultation 
on sustainable sleeping sickness con-
trol, representatives from countries 
to which HAT is endemic concluded 
that HAT elimination is possible (5). 
Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), an 
international nongovernment organi-
zation, wishes to challenge this con-
clusion.
Because of insufﬁ  cient coverage 
by surveillance systems, only a frac-
tion of HAT cases are reported. In 
2004, for example, although WHO 
received reports of only 17,500 new 
cases, they estimated that the actual 
incidence was 50,000–70,000 cases 
(6). Recent MSF HAT projects in re-
mote and politically unstable areas of 
the Central African Republic and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo are 
ﬁ   nding new information about the 
location and nature of some of these 
blind spots (areas without surveil-
lance) (Table).
In the zones de santé (administra-
tive districts) of Doruma, Ango, and 
Bili, in northeastern Democratic Re-
public of Congo, no HAT control ac-
tivities have taken place over the past 
3 decades, mainly because of extreme 
remoteness of these areas. In July 
2007, MSF launched a HAT control 
program and found high (3.4%) dis-
ease prevalence and a large propor-
tion of patients in the ﬁ  rst stage of 
the disease (60%), indicating intense 
transmission. In March 2009, the MSF 
team was attacked by rebels from the 
Lord’s Resistance Army, leading to 
total suspension of the project for an 
indeﬁ  nite period. The lack of trained 
staff in existing health structures and 
the complexity of HAT management 
prevented emergency handover of the 
project to local partners.
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